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THE CONUNDRUM OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY:
REFLECTIONS ON THE CHANGING NATURE OF FIRMS AND
STATES
Peer Zumbansen
“We are fiddling, while Rome burns.”1

A. INTRODUCTION
While its value as precedent, paradigm or standard-setter
continues to be disputed2 the Trail Smelter Arbitration3 plays an
important place in our contemporary search for adequate
instruments and forms of international environmental regulation.
Already the various contexts in which reference is made to Trail
Smelter communicate its multifaceted messages.4 Through the
eyes of today, Trail Smelter might seem outdated or skewed, in
particular its disputed construction of Canada’s responsibility for
the transboundary harm that was brought about by a private

1

JULIET SCHOR, A SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (1998), at 16.

2

See Jaye Ellis, Has International Law Outgrown Trail Smelter?, in this
volume.

3

See the 1938 and 1941 decisions: Trail Smelter Arbitral Decision, 33 AM. J.
INT’L L. 182 (1939) [hereinafter “Trail Smelter (1939)”]; Trail Smelter Arbitral
Decision, 35 AM. J. INT’L L. 684 (1941) [hereinafter “Trail Smelter (1941)”].
4

Alfred Rubin, Pollution by Analogy: The Trail Smelter Arbitration, 50 OR. L.
REV. 259, 259 (1971): “Every discussion of the international law of pollution
starts, and must end, with a mention of the Trail Smelter Arbitration…”;
Alhaji B.M. Marong, From Rio To Johannesburg: Reflections On The Role Of
International Legal Norms In Sustainable Development, 16 GEO. INT'L ENVTL.
L. REV. 21, 71 (2003); see also Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human Rights In A
Globalized World, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 273, 307 (2002), placing Trail
Smelter in the context of the emerging international law of state responsibility
for violations of other states’ rights even where these violations originate from
private actors. But see, Ellis, supra n. __.

2
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enterprise.5 And yet, while Trail Smelter stands apart from the
later development of international law and the doctrine of state
6
responsibility , it continues to engage our imagination. Trail
Smelter continues to resurface as a starting point for thinking
about adequate ways to resolve border crossing environmental
conflicts, but also other forms of transboundary harm.7 It does so,
precisely, by inspiring ongoing inquiries into the right balance
between State versus Market based strategies of environmental
8
regulation, and by prompting many of the pertinent questions
raised by de-territorialized corporate activities, highly diversified
regulatory structures, and the limited enforcement competences of
traditional political agencies.9

5

See Trail Smelter (1941), at 716: “…under the principles of international law,
as well as of the law of the United States, no State has the right to use or permit
the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the
territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of
serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing
evidence.”
6

See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The International Law of State Responsibility:
Revolution or Evolution?, 11 MICH. J. INT’L L. 105 (1989).

7

See the contributions by Holger Hestermeyer, Mark Anderson and Russell
Miller in this volume. See already Edith Brown Weiss, International
Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New World
Order, 81 GEO. L. J. 675, 677 (1993): “…because the Trail Smelter arbitration is a
rare example of international environmental adjudication [from an] early period,
it has acquired an unusually important place in the jurisprudence of
international environmental law.”
8

Eric Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1241 (1995):
“The inadequacy of command-and-control regulation fuels the hottest growth
industry in environmental law…”

9

See Bruce Ackerman/Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985); id., Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic
Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVT’L L. (1988); Benedict Sheehy,
Corporations and Social Costs: The Wal-Mart Case Study, 24 J.L. & COM. 1, 8-9
(2004), drawing attention to the focus on nuisances typical for cases of
atmospheric pollution such as in the Trail Smelter cases. See also Michael
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In this light, Trail Smelter must be read as inviting the following
questions: Who bears responsibility for extraterritorial harm
caused by transboundary pollution? Should state responsibility for
privately-induced transboundary harm replace or accompany
private responsibility? Does either concept of responsibility
respond to the particularly complex challenge posed by a
proliferation of decreasingly well-defined environmental harms,
dangers and risks? Shifting, then, our focus away from the state as
the exclusive author and enforcer of norms, and instead
concentrating on the private actors themselves, leads to the next
level of inquiry. What can these private or corporate actors
contribute to a comprehensive program of environmental
protection? How far can the state legitimately regulate corporate
activity without infringing on the corporation’s property rights?
What is the best mixture of state regulation and corporate selfregulation? Can, and should there be trade-offs between a ‘public’
environmental protection agenda and the ‘private’ acquisition, sale
and trading of pollution rights?
This paper cannot offer satisfying answers to all of these questions.
Instead, it will explore the changing role of the state and private
actors in environmental regulation. Hence, Trail Smelter is taken
as starting point for a series of reflections on contemporary
struggles over the right balance between public and private
instruments in the field of environmental protection. The
assignment of legal responsibility through the 1938 and 1941
arbitral decisions exposes two competing regulatory regimes that,
in the post-Trail Smelter Era, have undergone dramatic

Anderson, Transnational Corporations and Environmental Damage: Is Tort
Law the Answer?, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 399, 399 (2002), referring to the “relatively
straightforward” illustration by the Court of the issues at stake which made the
Decisions “paradigmatic for international environmental lawyers”; for a
foundational assessment of the emergence of risk-society, see ULRICH BECK, RISK
SOCIETY [1986] (1992); a concise restatement is provided by Beck, From
Industrial Society to Risk Society: Questions of Survival, Social Structure and
Ecological Enlightenment, 9 THEORY, CULTURE & SOCIETY 97 (1992).

4
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developments and further differentiations. Trail Smelter’s focus
on the responsibility of the state for environmental protection has
been strongly-questioned. Through the important role that non10
state actors played in the progress of the arbitral deliberations ,
Trail Smelter also implicitly raises various questions about
emerging alternative, private regimes of societal self-regulation.
Furthermore, Trail Smelter invites us to consider the shift away
from substantive standards of harm towards the adoption of
processes that permit a constant refinement not only of the
analytical frame, but also of the applied standards and the modes
by which environmental goals are pursued.11
This paper, thus, addresses the other side of Trail Smelter,
attempting to unfold its as-yet untold story of corporate
responsibility. This latter story speaks the language of private, selfregulation of environmental protection, of corporate selfregulation through codes of conduct, of soft law and corporate
social and environmental responsibility. These narratives emerge
when we focus on the business corporation as the primary locus
for the regulation of environmental harm. The private, selfregulatory challenge of corporate responsibility will thus be
discussed in close connection with the changes of the public side
of environmental law and the dramatic exhaustion of the state’s
regulatory capacities.12 The paper argues that there is a striking

10

See Miller, in this volume.

11

See hereto CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS. THE SOCIAL
CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975), at 122-3, describing the processoriented approach taken by the Environmental Protection Act.
12

See Gunther Teubner, Regulatory Law: Chronicle of a Death Foretold, 1 SOC
& LEG STUD. 451 (1992); see also Stepan Wood, The Role of the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) in Governing Environmental Conflict
and Corporate Social Responsibility in Developing Countries: Questions for
Research, in Beatriz Londoño Toro, ed., Propriedad, Conflicto y Medio
Ambiente 15-56 (Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad del Rosario 2004), underlining
the necessity to look beyond the traditional confines of environmental law and
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parallel between the state’s transformation into a collaborative,
contracting and learning entity that remains dramatically
dependent on private knowledge, and the modern business
corporation’s increasing assumption of public tasks as it grows in
size and function, spanning its organization and activities across a
seemingly borderless, global arena. Both, the state and the firm,
depend on knowledge to inform their strategic choices in a
regulatory environment that has ceased to lend itself to easy
consensus, to meaningful deliberation or to an effective, top-down
production and implementation of norms.13 In this volatile
strategic environment, the acquisition and administration of
14
knowledge becomes a challenge for both the ‘retreating’ state and
15
the boundary-less firm. For both the production of knowledge is
characterized by the fragility of intermittently-accepted standards,
recently-taken decisions and temporarily-reached agreements.
Fittingly, the term risk society16 has become common currency to
identify the background for the emergence of ‘knowledge
management’ as being the foremost challenge to knowledge-driven
entities. This paper argues that this challenge is put to both the
state and to the business corporation as the knowledge society
moves the element of risk from the outside of management into
its heart. Risks are no longer outside norm-production with regard
to a norm’s real-world consequences. Instead, risks are inherent to

to recognize corporate codes as potentially powerful sources of effective
environmental regulation.
13

IAN AYRES/JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992).
14

SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE (1996).

15

Robert Boyer/J. Rogers Hollingsworth, From National Embeddedness to
Spatial and Institutional Nestedness, in CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM. THE
EMBEDDEDNESS OF INSTITUTIONS 433 (Robert Boyer/J. Rogers Hollingsworth eds.,
1997).
16

See, e.g., Michael Power, From Risk Society to Audit Society, 3 SOZIALE
SYSTEME 3, 5 (1997).

6
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the decision-making process itself, as they originate in the social
17
production of knowledge and norms rather than in nature itself.

B. PUBLIC V. PRIVATE ORDERING: WHAT WE KNOW
AND WHAT WE DON’T KNOW ABOUT REGULATORY
LAW18
The Trail Smelter decisions were already contemplating many of
these issues. As Russell Miller argues in this volume, this
contemplative legacy might outweigh the Tribunal’s “correctness”
in producing a doctrinally sound solution to every problem
touched upon in the arbitration.19 Although the Tribunal addressed
the border-crossing dimension of the smelter’s pollution, it
ultimately took refuge in the construction of state responsibility
without offering, in fact, a fully satisfactory justification for this
holding.20 The legacy of this holding is that it has no legacy.
International environmental law has not embraced the Tribunal’s
construction of state responsibility21, but has instead embraced a
‘movement from status to contract’.22 Against the background of
ever more, and ever more detailed, international environmental
law treaties, the role of state responsibility “in addressing global

17

Id.

18

The inspiration for this heading comes certainly from Ian Macneil’s wonderful

article, Relational Contract: What We Know and What We Don’t Know, 1985
WISCONSIN L. REV. 483.
19

See Miller, in this volume.

20

Trail Smelter (1941), at 716-717.

21

See Ellis, in this volume.

22

See for the origin of this idea, HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1861).
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environmental problems” has increasingly been questioned.23
Meanwhile, the success of negotiation, contract and treaty is,
itself, curtailed by the fundamental complexities of environmental
damages and the resulting challenge of addressing and regulating
24
them. In this light, the law of environmental protection is a case
in point for the challenge to regulatory law under conditions of
extreme uncertainty.25 We therefore need to sketch the context of
regulatory state law in which environmental law has so long been
conceptualized.

I. LEGACIES AND LEGENDS OF TRAIL
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

SMELTER

IN

The rise and proliferation of international environmental law has
shifted the focus from the nation state to international regimes
and international, treaty based conflict resolution.26 It is against
this background, that the failure of the United States to embrace

23

Jutta Brunée, Of Sense and Sensibility: International Liability Regimes as a
Tool for Environmental Protection, in RECONCILING LAW, JUSTICE AND POLITICS
IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA 110, 113-114 (CANADIAN COUNCIL ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW ED., 2003); Thomas Gehring/Markus Jachtenfuchs, Civil
Liability for Transboundary Environmental Harm, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 92, 93
(1993): “With continuing industrialization and increasing risks of transboundary
environmental damage, there is a growing need to establish specific rules that
are precise enough to be applicable and that are therefore apt to be ‘effective’.
However, a derivation of these specific rules in the area of transboundary
environmental damage from the general law of state responsibility involves a
number of fundamental problems.”
24

Brunnée, supra, at 114: “”Important aspects even of central international
environmental norms remain opaque. To begin with, the legal status and
content of several key norms, such as the precautionary principle, sustainable
development, common concern, or common but differentiated responsibilities,
remain contested.”
25

See Gehring/Jachtenfuchs, supra, at 93. Bratspies, elsewhere in this volume.

26

Drumbl, elsewhere in this volume.

8
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the Kyoto Protocol is a dramatic fall-back.27 On a more conceptual
level, the development of environmental law on the international
plane has been propelled prominently by the rise of the
precautionary principle that complements the traditional
causation-based liability standard by a complex, scientifically open
standard.28 The precautionary principle’s most important effect is
its improved level of risk assessment with regard to unknown or,
at least, difficult-to-assess environmental risks. Despite its
disputed function as “precedent” for international environmental
law, Trail Smelter can be read as addressing the same challenge
that is met by the precautionary principle, including the
procedural approach that led to the arbitration itself as well as to
the bilateral resolution of the conflict.
In addition, international law makers have viewed the
precautionary principle’s flexibility as an incentive to engage in
international cooperation in environmental risk assessment. Here
we can see the valuable enrichment of nation-state based research
programs and institutions by an irrevocable trend towards
cooperation among states and non-state actors, eventually fueling
further the transnational and global growth of norms and

27

See Miller, in this volume; see the discussion in W. Brandee Chambers,
Towards an Improved Understanding of Legal Effectiveness of International
Environmental Treaties, 16 GEO. INT’L ENVT’L L. REV. 501 (2004).
28

Jon M. Van Dyke, The Evolution and International Acceptance of the
Precautionary Principle, in: Bringing the Law to Ocean Waters 357, 357 (D.D.
Caron/H.N. Schreiber eds., 2004), arguing that even with remaining skepticism
as to its definitional boundaries, the precautionary principle, over the course of
the last two decades, “can no longer be ignored.” See also Carolin Hillemanns,
UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights, 4 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL
1065, 1976 (2003), pointing out that the recently published UN Norms for
Human Rights Obligations for transnational corporations explicitly command
that corporations observe the precautionary principle.
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standards, promoted
29
organizations.

by

non-state-actors

9

and

international

30
Meanwhile, this global development in norm-production mirrors
the dynamics of a changing regulatory regime within the nationstate. The political economy of the nation-state is most adequately
described by the fragmentation of public arenas into specialized
discourses and by the emergence of a comprehensive and
increasingly de-territorialized knowledge economy.31 The
following section shall, albeit briefly, highlight a number of
decisive elements of the transformed landscape of the regulatory
state at the beginning of the 21st Century, and will measure the
changing face of environmental risk regulation against a backdrop
of larger transformations of the political economy of domestic and
transnational regulation.

II. REGULATION AND DISPERSED KNOWLEDGE
The exhaustion of the regulatory (welfare) state on the domestic
level,32 and the much-disputed demise of the state as sole actor on

29

See, e.g., NILS BRUNSSON/BENGT JACOBSSON, A WORLD OF STANDARDS (2000);
Walter Mattli/Tim Büthe, Setting International Standards: Technological
Rationality or Primacy of Power?, 56 World Politics 1 (2003); Peer Zumbansen,
Transnational Law, in: ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW (JAN SMITS ED.,
2005).
30

See the account by Andreas Fischer-Lescano/Gunther Teubner, Regime
Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global
Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999 (2004).
31

See only NICO STEHR, WISSEN UND WIRTSCHAFTEN (2001); MICHAEL S.
PIORE/CHARLES SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE (1984); PETER BURKE, A
SOCIAL HISTORY OF KNOWLEGDE: FROM GUTENBERG TO DIDEROT (2000).
32

Jürgen Habermas, The New Obscurity: The Crisis of the Welfare State and the
Exhaustion of Utopian Energies [1985], in: id., THE NEW CONSERVATISM.
CULTURAL CRITICISM AND THE HISTORIANS' DEBATE [ED. AND TRANSL. BY SHIERRY
WEBER NICHOLSEN] 48 (1989).

10
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the international legal and institutional plane,33 constitute the fastchanging context of national, supranational and transnational
34
regulatory experiments, networks and political hopes.
Environmental protection is a classic case of the ‘regulatory state
under siege’, because it constantly faces the multifaceted challenge
of identifying the problem, and designing the instruments to
combat the problem, while at the same time defining the
appropriate scope and direction of the state’s response.35 A clear
expression of this normative and institutional challenge is the
United States’ 1984 Chevron decision, in which the United States’
Supreme Court recognized the crucial role of agencies in
36
Chevron is rightly regarded as a
interpreting statutes.
paradigmatic case in transforming American administrative law
into a responsive, knowledge-based regulatory regime.37 The
recognition of the knowledge-based, interpretative role of
administrative agencies is particularly prevalent in the field of
environmental law where expert knowledge has long been
considered crucial.38 Chevron forms part of a long-term

33

Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485, 487 (2005); Peer Zumbansen, Die vergangene
Zukunft des Völkerrechts, 34 KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 46, 50-53 (2001).
34

See the excellent overview by David Levi-Faur, The Global Diffusion of
Regulatory Capitalism, 598 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL
AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 12 (2004); Oren Perez, Normative Creativity and Global
Legal Pluralism: Reflections on the Democratic Critique of Transnational Law,
10 IND. J. GLOB. LEG. STUD. 25 (2003).
35

ERHARD DENNINGER, VERFASSUNGSRECHTLICHE ANFORDERUNGEN AN DIE
NORMSETZUNG IM UMWELT- UND TECHNIKRECHT (1990); Ackerman/Stewart,
Reforming Environmental Law (1988), supra.
36

Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)

37

See, e.g., E, Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine
Redefined the Roles of Congress, Courts, and Agencies in Environmental Law,
XVIU VILL. ENV. L.J. 1, 3 (2005).
38

See id., at 14-15.
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transformation of a legalistic, functionalist understanding of the
39
This
state into an “expertise-driven” regulatory regime.
transformation is marked by the increased inclusion of private
actors in public action, raising not only far-reaching questions as
to its democratic accountability and legitimacy40, but also to the
fundamental dilemma of how the state is to gain, produce, and
process the necessary regulatory knowledge that is needed.
An essential feature of this contemporary transformation in
regulatory theory concerns not only the institutional dimension of
the regulatory response to transboundary harm, but its normative
quality. Administrative agencies and other regulatory actors
increasingly resort to procedural, experimental and, ultimately,
learning forms of regulation when designing statutes, standards
and sanctions targeted at polluters and other addressees of
regulation.41 The most remarkable feature of these new forms of
regulation is the regulator’s recognition of its likely failure in
designing an ultimately successful and effective regulatory
instrument, in particular, when dealing with an unidentified
polluter, a plurality of actors42 or, more generally, when having to

39

See already JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).

40

Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,
547 (2000), referring to the prevailing “hierarchical, agency-centered conception
of administrative power”.

41

See Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Coping with Uncertainty: Ecological Risks and the
Proceduralization of Environmental Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
ECOLOGICAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF ECOLOGICAL SELFORGANIZATION 299 (GUNTHER TEUBNER/LINDSAY FARMER/DECLAN MURPHY
EDS., 1994); ID., DAS UMWELTRECHT DER WISSENSGESELLSCHAFT (1995); see also
Liora Salter, Institutional Learning in Standards Setting, in INNOVATION AND
SOCIAL LEARNING: INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTATION IN AN ERA OF TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE 65 (MERIC S. GERTLER/DAVID A. WOLFE EDS., 2002).
42

See only Gunther Teubner, The Invisible Cupola: From Causal to Collective
Attribution in Ecological Liability, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ECOLOGICAL
RESPONSIBILITY, supra, note 42, at 17.
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base a regulatory response or program on constantly changing
43
factual and technical data.
44
The post-industrial, “contracting” state no longer finds itself on
top of a hierarchical order in which it can effectively set the
direction of societal change. Instead, the state has become a label
for the political system that forms a mere part of a more
comprehensive, encompassing social arrangement that has neither
center nor top, but is broken down into a multitude of social
45
systems of autopoietic reproduction. Likewise, the knowledge
society knows no central regulator, but is made up of a multitude
of decentralized, dramatically fragmented loci of knowledge
production. This new structure has dramatic consequences for our
understanding of law, which hitherto had been described in close
association with the entity of the state and its political agencies of
norm-creation.46 In contrast, the law of the knowledge society is
de-centered from the political system, it forms in communication
with different social systems and, consequently, embraces
constantly changing conditions of experimental, reflexive normproduction. In this light, the separation of “state and society”, the
distinction between public and private law, must be seen as
historical concepts used to describe law’s attachment to particular
institutions of norm-creation. The determining characteristic of
the ‘non-interventionist’, ‘post-regulatory’ law of the knowledge

43

See generally Ulrich Beck, ECOLOGICAL POLITICS IN AN AGE OF RISK (1995). We
should remember that Trail Smelter in particular raised the problem of a known
polluter but constantly changing technical data.

44

IAN HARDEN, THE CONTRACTING STATE (1992); Jody Freeman, The Contracting
State, 28 FLA. ST. L. REV. 155 (2000).

45

See NIKLAS LUHMANN, OBSERVATIONS ON MODERNITY [1992] (William
Whobrey transl., 1998); Gunther Teubner, The King’s Many Bodies: the SelfDestruction of Law’s Hierarchy, 34 LAW & SOC’TY REV. 753 (1997).

46

This is striking, for example, in constitutional law: see hereto, Neil Walker,
The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, 65 MOD. L. REV. 317 (2002).

2006]

THE CONUNDRUM OF CSR

13

society is its responsiveness.47 Incessantly adapting and changing,
48
this newly responsive vision of law can, at least in theory,
assume the regulatory stance most appropriate at any given
moment.
Against this background, then, how can we describe the state and
the changing nature of the state in supervising these activities?
Where the state formerly assumed legislative authority in
regulating fields of corporate action with regard to environmental
protection, the heavy reliance on scientific evidence and the
standardization by private entities necessitates a thorough
overhaul of the state’s prerogative in regulating pollution and
other environmental harm. A dense interwoven network of public
and private action materializes. The changed nature of the
supervision-state (or, the environmental, regulatory, prevention
state49) is highly volatile, fragile, and dependent on fragmented
knowledge, domestically and transnationally.50 Success depends on
the state being able to absorb private knowledge in an optimal
manner. The state, therefore, is increasingly expected to engage in
innovative cooperation with private parties in initiating, funding
and generating scientific research. Enforcing an effective
environmental protection scheme thus requires the state to
transform itself from the regulatory interventionist state and to
adopt new roles as a moderator of private, commercial selfregulation and public policy interests on the one hand, and tort
law enforcer – both based on national and international law – on

47

See AYRES/BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION, supra, note 10.

48

Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 L.
& SOC’Y REV. 239 (1983).
49

See for these categories, GRALF-PETER CALLIESS, PROZEDURALES RECHT (1999);
HELMUT WILLKE, SUPERVISION DES STAATES (1997).
50

See also ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004), describing
worldwide communications between various regulatory agencies, and other
state and non-state bodies.
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the other. Facing constantly growing and differentiating
governance problems, the state is pressed to rely on private selforganization in reaching its goals. While the state must constantly
augment and update its working knowledge of these forms of
public-private governance, it is necessary to gain a better
understanding of the actor on the other, ‘private’ side of this
relationship. It is against this background that the following
section will attempt to unfold the conundrum of corporate social
and environmental responsibility.

C. THE OTHER SIDE OF TRAIL SMELTER: TRACING
NARRATIVES OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITIES
While Trail Smelter clearly speaks to the public, state-oriented
dimension of transnational responsibility, its other message is
much quieter, less audible, discernible only in its conceptual,
theoretical background. It is, in a nutshell, the story of the rise and
fall and, eventually, the rebirth of a dramatically transformed
regulatory private law.51 On first impression, Trail Smelter seems
silent on this private dimension of the conflict resolution. In the
background, however, of the Tribunal’s discussion of state
responsibility, we can easily discern the potential and the promise
of private responsibility. Hence, our focus on Trail Smelter’s
second, untold story, shall be on corporate responsibility. It is a
story that we find in our contemporary reading of Trail Smelter’s
central focus on state responsibility. But, our focus will neither be
that nor the often-discussed, substantive side of the corporation’s

51

See Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, supra; see
also Peer Zumbansen, Quod Omnes Tangit: Globalization, Welfare Regimes
and Entitlements, in: THE WELFARE STATE, GLOBALIZATION, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 135-173 (BENVENISTI/NOLTE EDS., 2003)
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responsibility.52 Instead, we are interested in the law-making
dimension of corporate social and environmental responsibility
(CSR)-- in the regulatory context and in the political economy of
CSR to be precise. This section will argue that to understand the
regulatory dimension of the firm’s responsibilities to society at
large, we must now, after our brief exploration of the changing
dimensions of public, state-centred regulation, look to the
corporation itself, to its role and function in a dramatically
changing and globalizing socio-economic environment.
In studying the political economy of corporate (environmental,
social) responsibility, we must place the CSR debate within the
context of three connected discourses that indirectly speak to
corporate social responsibility. These discourses concern the
briefly sketched themes of environmental regulation through
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law as well as the transformation of the regulatory
state into a supervising and moderating state in the knowledge
economy. The third discourse that we need to explore concerns
the political economy of the “embedded” corporation, in other
words, the domestic and transnational, regulatory framework and
context of corporate activity, but also the norms internal to the
organization and governance of the business corporation.53 Taken
together, these discourses inform any assessment of the
corporation’s larger social, political and environmental
responsibilities. It is the central contention of this paper, that
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See the brilliant exposition by Walter Powell, The Capitalist Firm in the
Twenty-First Century: Emerging Patterns in Western Enterprise, in: THE
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unfolding the conundrum of corporate social responsibility (“What
is the scope and the content of the corporation’s
responsibility/ies?”; “What are the adequate regulatory
mechanisms to implant, consolidate and enforce these
responsibilities?”;
“Does this lead to an undue (public)
intervention into (private) corporate law, in other words: Does
‘corporate law’ extend to the regulation of CSR?”) against the justdescribed background of surrounding theoretical inquiry can help
us to adequately address the wider conditions of any meaningful
concept of CSR.
It is here, where we shall turn our focus away from the usual
target, the state and its regulatory responses and, instead, focus on
the corporation itself. Doing so will allow us to gain a better
understanding of the social actor that is most often involved in
dramatic cases of environmental harm and, increasingly,
implicated in the continuing search for an appropriate regulatory
response.54

I. WHAT’S IN A FIRM? UNFOLDING
STATE RESPONSIBILITY

THE

CONUNDRUM

OF

The untiring discussion over scope and content, direction and
aspirations of “Corporate Social Responsibility” (CSR) is a
reminder of what we know and do not know about the very
subject and object of our contemporary explorations of the social,
environmental, in short: the larger societal, public obligations of
the corporation.55 Whether a corporation is merely a private, profitoriented undertaking, or whether – perhaps in addition – it bears
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See, e.g., Michael Power, Constructing the Responsible Organization:
Accounting and Environmental Representation, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
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non-contractual responsibilities to society at large, employees,
creditors, the community and other stakeholders, has not ceased
56
to occupy our minds. This inquiry has certainly contributed to a
far-reaching, societal discussion about the function and role of
large corporations in society, in both the domestic and the
transnational context. It has furthered and instigated a more
popular awareness of corporate activities worldwide.57 But, while
case law and literature regarding the corporation’s larger role in
society abound, little knowledge apparently is advanced about the
corporation itself. Surely, the corporation, the large publicly-held
corporation, the multinational enterprise, the embedded
corporation, are researched, analyzed and explored with great
scholarly earnestness and policy interest. And yet, it seems that
these many assessments of shareholder primacy or stakeholder
theory actually contribute very little to a better understanding of
the corporation. And with increasing contestation of the public
58
and political role of corporations , we risk losing sight of the very
locus of ideological battles.
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The “unknown firm” is surely not a promising starting point for
our continued discussion over the corporation’s societal
responsibilities.The corporation remains unknown, because
neither the CSR debate nor the larger dispute over convergence or
59
divergence of corporate governance systems deliver a more
concrete description of what actually goes on inside of the
corporation, what the corporation does, how it decides, and how it
adapts to a dramatically nervous economic and political
environment. While an analysis of the socio-economic and
regulatory context and environment in which corporations operate
may be necessary to understand the embeddedness of the
corporation, our inquiry must extend to the corporation itself. In
other words, while we must focus on the ‘political economy of the
corporation’60, its socio-economic, regulatory context in light of
national path dependencies and international comparisons61, our
other target must be the corporation as a complex organizational
entity of social learning. With a focus on the organizational design
of today’s corporation, we can begin to understand and to
conceptualize the corporation as a complex and innovative
institution of social learning in the context of building a
sustainable economy. Does Trail Smelter offer any guidance or
lesson?
The still governing corporate law theory that describes the firm as
a nexus of contracts must be reread in light of the changes that
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affect both the state’s and the business corporation’s activity. Both
operate under conditions of an eroding knowledge base and the
ensuing demand for better and more adequate risk assessment.
The firm becomes, especially as it assumes ever more public tasks
in infrastructure provision and public service delivery, a hybrid
actor – neither private nor public –at a crossroads of intertwining
demands from the “state” and the “market”. The theory of the
firm can thus be compared to contemporary theoretical enquiries
into the theory of the state.

II. POST-HEROIC MANAGEMENT
The key to understanding the contemporary corporation in the
political economy of the de-territorialized knowledge economy is
to focus on its capacity to remain innovative.62 The firm’s capacity
to engage in innovative production depends on its ability to
constantly grow, adapt and learn. This it can do by letting go of
traditional modes of command and control, and, instead,
embracing an ironical, distancing, reflecting and post-heroic
attitude to corporate governance and management.63 Our urgentlysought definition of corporate responsibilities, its public duties
and obligations to society at large, especially in an era of
scandalous corporate crime64, depends entirely on our
understanding of the firm itself. It is here where we recognize the
relevance for our theme of the fierce battle between shareholdervalue oriented systems of corporate control and those that place a
higher emphasis on workers’ voice, participation, industrial
relations, and a wider consideration of the firm’s stakeholders.65
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Whether we lay our emphasis on the shareholder or on the
stakeholder dimension of the firm, will have a significant impact
66
on our assignment of duties and obligations of the firm. This is
particularly prevalent with regard to disclosure. Where corporate
governance reform is predominantly concerned with shareholders,
the emphasis is likely to remain placed – at least for the time
being – on improvements in the financial auditing schemes. In
contrast, were our focus on an improved environmental
accountability of the firm, we would indeed direct our initiatives
at other areas in corporate organization. Environmental internal
auditing, in fact, constitutes a prime example of the latter
67
developments in environmental, corporate self-regulation.
Restated thus, the question of the firm’s responsibilities cannot be
separated from our foundational understanding of the firm.
However, this perspective on the connection between the political
economy of the firm and the firm’s environmental (or wider social)
responsibilities, fails to account for our remaining lack of
knowledge of the corporation itself. Today’s large, publicly held
and globally operating firms, escape clear definitions, both with
regard to their core activities or ‘competences’68 and their
organizational structure. Increasingly, firms have become
unbounded, borderless and virtual, with activities that span
multiple areas of industry, manufacture or soft products. Echoing
many of the challenges that we identified for the state today in a
complex society, the firm constitutes a highly complex
organization that operates in a volatile regulatory and competitive
environment.
Rejecting
thus,
both
overly
simplistic
categorizations of the firm as either shareholder or stakeholder
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oriented, the firm of the 21st Century challenges our learned ways
of organizing social behaviour. Shifting the CSR debate away from
the control-oriented images of the corporation, is an essential step
in beginning to understand the question of the firm’s social
responsibilities. Instead, the firm must be viewed within a
complex web made up of the socio-economic framework, the
embeddedness of the corporation, the internal organization of
corporate governance, and the organizational experiments of a
constantly evolving, dynamic, multipolar business enterprise.
While the latter two dimensions describe the corporation as a
communicative, self-referential being, the first dimension speaks
of the embeddedness of the firm, its socio-economic and political
place in a dramatically changing local and global environment.
With the corporation increasingly assuming formerly public
functions (welfare, pensions, medical care), we must reconsider
our understanding of the firm’s allegedly exclusively private
character. Where it has become increasingly difficult to assign to
social activities the label public or private, this certainly extends
to our conception of the business corporation. Understanding the
firm is the first step towards understanding the challenge of
corporate social responsibility.

